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Arab-U.S. Migration: The Effects of Exchange Rates, Politics and Oil  
 
 
 
Abstract
 
We hypothesize that exchange rates, commodity prices and geopolitical instability can 
affect international migration. If migrants send their earnings home, then appreciation of 
the destination country’s currency will make remittances more valuable in the home 
country, raising the likelihood of migration. Higher commodity prices in the home 
country can, on the one hand, discourage migration because of improved labor market 
opportunities at home, but can, on the other, encourage migration because greater 
prosperity makes relocation more affordable. Some parts of the World, for example the 
Middle East, have experienced considerable geopolitical instability, which may have 
induced greater levels of supply-push migration to more stable parts of the World.  Our 
test case is the migration of persons from the Arab region to the USA during 1992-2004, 
a period characterized by volatility in Arab-U.S. exchange rates, oil prices and political 
conditions. We estimate a fixed effects model of the Arab emigration rate using a sample 
of 182 observations, which includes 14 countries (10 Arab and 4 others in a control 
group). One of our control variables is the real relative return to remittances, which is 
the ratio of the exchange rate-adjusted real wage in the USA to the exchange rate- 
adjusted real wage in the UK.  Our econometric results demonstrate that: (i) Arab 
demand for U.S. visas is positively and significantly related to the real return to remitting, 
although the relationship is stronger for total visa demand than for employment visa 
demand; (ii) A one-dollar increase in the real price of oil from its mean will increase the 
flow of Arab migrants to the USA by over 505 persons; (iii) For every Arab who has 
migrated in the past, roughly 5 persons will follow him; and (iv) While the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks ceteris paribus stimulated migration, the 2003 Iraq-American war dampened it. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
     There is now a large and multi-disciplinary literature on migration from developing to 
developed countries. Some of these studies focus on the “Brain Drain,” i.e. the 
international transfer of human capital from developing to developed countries,1 while 
others focus on migrant remittances,2 illegal migration3 and migration as part of a 
family’s decision to ease liquidity constraints.4 The prevailing theme in this literature is 
that the “South to North” movement of human capital is driven by differential economic 
opportunities, migration costs, network effects,5  immigration policies6 and household 
liquidity constraints in the source country.7 Empirical work in this area has often been 
hampered by lack of source country data.   
     Generally overlooked in this literature are the potential influences of exchange rates, 
commodity prices and geopolitical instability on the volume of migration flows. If 
international migrants remit their earnings back home, appreciation (depreciation) of the 
destination country’s currency will make remittances sent home more (less) valuable and 
may boost (lower) the likelihood of migration. While there is recent work on how 
exchange rate uncertainty affects remittances (Higgins, Hysenbegasi and Pozo (2004), for 
example), the relationship between exchange rates and the volume of migration flows has 
not been explored. Some parts of the developing World, e.g. Africa, Latin America and 
the Middle East, have been sources of geopolitical instability, yet very little is known 
about how such instability affects the volume of migration flows to the developed 
World.8 In some parts of the developing World, commodity prices exert major effects on 
source country economies. For example, the economies of various African countries are 
very sensitive to fluctuations in World crop prices and changes in the World price of oil 
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exert major effects on economies in the Arab region. How do fluctuations in commodity 
prices affect migratory outflows to the developed World? On the one hand, the prosperity 
at home brought about by higher commodity prices could make international migration 
less attractive, while on the other this prosperity could make migration more affordable. 
The linkage between commodity prices and international migration flows is generally not 
understood. 
     In this study, we examine the effects of exchange rates, geopolitical instability and 
commodity prices on international migration from Developing to Developed Countries. 
Our test case is migration from the Arab region to the USA, a case which has received 
virtually no attention in the economics of migration literature9, but which is ideal for 
analyzing the effects of exchange rates, geopolitical events and commodity prices on 
migration.  
     The Arab test case is particularly interesting for migration researchers because of a 
confluence of factors, some internal to the region and others that are geopolitical in 
nature but strongly associated with the region. First, the population of the Arab region has 
grown rapidly. The region’s population totaled about 284 million in 2000 and has grown 
rapidly over the past thirty years.10 Second, Arab nations differ greatly in their natural 
resource endowments, particularly oil.11   Volatility in the price of oil over the last forty 
years has had significant effects on internal and international migration of labor in the 
entire Arab region.12 Third, Arab countries, particularly the oil-producing states, have 
been important destinations for migrant remittances.13 Fourth, some Arab countries have 
become increasingly reliant on external migration, particularly to the U.S. and Europe. 
With unemployment rates for some countries averaging close to 20% and with youth 
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unemployment rates close to 40%, increasing labor mobility has traditionally been the 
only effective means by which to combat poverty and high unemployment in the region.  
     Two other important factors contribute to making the Arab test case a worthwhile 
focus of inquiry. First, the 1991 Gulf War, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Center in New York City and the onset of the Iraq-American War in 
2003 may have disrupted long term Arab external migration patterns. For example, 
because the 9/11 terrorists came from the region and there were frequent reports of 
discriminatory behavior towards Arabs living in the U.S. in the aftermath of the attacks, 
prospective Arab migrants may have been deterred from relocating to the U.S. due to fear 
of increased prejudice and anger towards them by Americans, as well as substantially 
increased surveillance by U.S. immigration and law enforcement authorities. On the other 
hand, the rise of a very conservative brand of Islam in the Arab region following the 9/11 
attacks may have encouraged less conservative practitioners of Islam to migrate to the 
West. Second, exchange rates between some of the Arab countries and the U.S. have 
been extremely volatile since the early 1990s. 14 Since many migrants are known to remit 
earnings back home, gyrations in the exchange rate will affect the value of remittances in 
the source country’s currency and thus the decision to migrate.     
     We estimate an expanded model of rates of Arab migration to the USA using annual 
data for 10 Arab countries (7 oil-producing) and 4 non-Arab countries for the period 
1992-2004. The non-Arab countries were included to control for World-wide 
macroeconomic conditions and trends in international migration. We hypothesize that 
admissions of Arab migrants will depend upon real income differences, exchange rates, 
real oil prices, past flows of migrants from the Arab region to the USA, opportunities in 
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the U.K. labor market, U.S. immigration policy and political instability in the Arab 
region. One novel variable included in the model is the exchange rate-adjusted ratio of 
real wages in the USA to real wages in the UK, which measures the real relative return to 
remitting U.S. income back home.  
 
II. AN EXPANDED MIGRATION MODEL 
     We estimate an expanded version of the traditional migration model, building upon 
the work of  Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1969), Greenwood and McDowell (1991) and 
Hatton and Williamson (2002), to name a few prominent studies. Our model specifically 
extends the work of: (1) Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2002), who relate rates of 
international migration flows to the USA  to real income differences, U.S. immigration 
policy, migration costs and various social indicators of the source and receiving 
countries; and (2) Greenwood and McDowell (1991), who relate migration rates to real 
income differences, the relative costs of transferring occupational skills, development and 
political conditions in the source country and various institutional control variables. Our 
model, however, includes three variables not found in these and earlier international 
migration studies – exchange rates, commodity prices in the source region and real 
earnings opportunities in an alternative destination.  
     We estimate the following fixed effects model of the emigration rate, 
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where i denotes source country and t denotes the period during which a migration flow 
takes place. In the above equation M is the number of persons migrating, POP is 
population of the source country, COSTS is a measure of the affordability of relocating to 
the destination country relative to that of an alternative destination, XA is the nominal 
price of the source country’s currency in units of destination country A’s currency, XB is 
the nominal price of the source country’s currency in units of alternative destination 
country B’s currency, WA is the real wage in A, WB is the real wage in B, OIL is the real 
World price of oil, ktPOP
M
−)(  is the emigration rate k periods earlier (a measure of past 
migration flows), INCOME is real income available to the migrant if he stays in his home 
country,  CRISIS is a vector of dummies equaling one if a geopolitical event relating to 
the source country or region is in effect, POLICY is a vector of dummies equaling one if 
there are immigration policies in the destination country that are capable of affecting 
migration flows from the source country, COUNTRY is a dummy equaling one for the 
source country and (OIL)(OILCOUNTRY) is an interaction between the oil price and a 
dummy equaling one if the source country is an oil-producing country, β0 is an intercept 
and ε is a classically well-behaved error.  
     The COSTS term is hypothesized to have a positive relationship with the emigration 
rate (β1 > 0) and is measured in two different ways. First, we use the ratio of exchange 
rates, (XA/XB). If destination country A’s price of the source country’s currency rises 
relative to alternative destination country B’s price of the source country’s currency, then 
migration to A will rise.15 Second, we create a relative affordability ratio that takes into 
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account both exchange rates and distances in air miles. This ratio is 
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where DISTANCEA is air miles from the source country to destination country A and 
DISTANCEB is air miles from the source country to alternative destination country B. If 
A’s price of the source country’s currency rises, for example, then the affordability of 
migration to A rises relative to the affordability of migration to B, encouraging more 
migration to A. 
     The hypothesized relationship between the emigration rate and the ratio of the 
exchange rate-adjusted real wage in destination country A to the exchange rate-adjusted 
real wage in alternative destination country B, 
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, is positive (β2 > 0). There are 
two reasons for this hypothesized relationship. First, this ratio accounts for the economic 
advantage of migrating to A relative to B; if the real wage in A rises, then ceteris paribus 
its labor market becomes more attractive and there will be a stronger incentive to migrate 
there. Second, assuming that a migrant remits part of his wage income back home, 
because we are adjusting the relative real wage by the relative exchange rate, the ratio in 
brackets above also measures the real relative return to remittances.    
     The real relative return to remittances variable is best illustrated by example. Suppose 
destination country A is the U.S. and alternative destination country B is the U.K.  Then 
the ratio )(
A
A
X
W
 equals the migrant’s purchasing power in the U.S. expressed in units of 
his home country’s currency, as well as the amount of his U.S. remittances spent by 
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family and friends back home. In contrast, the denominator )(
B
B
X
W
 equals the migrant’s 
purchasing power in the U.K. expressed in units of his home country’s currency, as well 
as the amount of U.K. remittances spent by family and friends back home. If )(
A
A
X
W
 rises 
relative to )(
B
B
X
W
, then the value of U.S. remittances received by family and friends back 
home rises relative to the value of U.K. remittances received. Consequently, remitting 
one’s wage income earned in the U.S. will be viewed as more attractive and this, all other 
things equal, will encourage more migration to the U.S. In contrast, if )(
A
A
X
W
 falls relative 
to )(
B
B
X
W
 , the value of U.S. remittances will fall relative to the value of U.K. remittances 
and this will discourage migration to the U.S.      
          We hypothesize that the World price of oil (OIL) is capable of affecting the 
emigration rate in several different ways. On the one hand, higher oil prices bring 
prosperity to the region; oil-induced prosperity in the oil-producing states will stimulate 
the demand for goods made in the non-oil-producing states, increased tourism by oil-
producing state residents in the non-oil-producing states and increased remittances sent 
home by oil workers who migrated from the non-oil-producing states. Because of 
improved labor market opportunities in the region, migration abroad will tend to be less 
attractive. Furthermore, higher oil prices are very likely to encourage internal migration 
to the oil-producing states, which should also contribute to less international migration.  
Ceteris paribus, both these effects should lead to a negative sign on the β3 coefficient. On 
the other hand, oil-driven prosperity is likely to make long distance international 
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migration more affordable, which ceteris paribus should raise the emigration rate. 
Consequently, the sign of β3 will depend upon which of these two effects dominates. 
There is an additional hypothesized effect of oil prices; higher oil prices will stimulate the 
demand for native workers in the oil-producing countries, which will discourage 
international migration by those workers. This effect is captured separately in the 
(OIL)(OILCOUNTRY) interaction term and we hypothesize a negative sign. 
      Following previous models of migration, the higher are flows of migrants from the 
source country to the destination country in a earlier periods (the higher is 
POP
M ), the 
greater will be the emigration rate (β4 > 0); pecuniary and non-pecuniary migration costs 
will be lower when migrants have more extensive family ties and immigrant enclaves are 
larger in the destination country. Also consistent with previous models, the greater are 
real income opportunities in the country of origin (the higher is INCOME), the lower will 
be the emigration rate (β5 < 0). 
 
III. A TEST OF THE ARAB MIGRATION MODEL 
Choice of sample countries   
      
     Economic studies of the Arab region are often severely constrained by lack of 
available data, particularly for certain countries. The quantity and quality of data-
gathering by Arab governments differ significantly. Some countries have only recently 
begun making accurate and continual time series available to researchers, for example, 
and in some countries there have been lengthy gaps in data-gathering due to war or 
budget constraints. Consequently, we were constrained to only sample a subset of 
countries in the region and only on data since the early 1990s. 
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     In choosing our subset of countries, we used three criteria: (i) so that we could test for 
the effects of changes in oil prices on emigration to the U.S., part of the sample had to 
come from the oil-producing part of the region; (ii) so that we could test for the effects of 
Arab-related geopolitical shocks on emigration to the U.S., part of the sample had to 
include observations from countries that that have been associated with geopolitical 
instability, e.g. war and domestic political shocks; and (iii) all the countries in the sample 
had to have experienced relatively significant, but differing, levels of international 
emigration, particularly to the U.S.   
     Ten countries satisfied these criteria -- Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait, 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen.  All these 
countries contributed significantly to migration in the Arab region, both internally and 
internationally. Seven are oil-producing (Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE 
and Yemen) and some have experienced internal political turmoil since the early 1990s, 
e.g. Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria and Yemen. Iraq is obviously a standout case because it 
is an oil-producing state that has recently experienced tremendous political turmoil. 
     To control for World-wide economic and socio-political trends that may have affected 
international migration from the Arab region, we also included in our sample 4 non-Arab 
countries. This subset includes India, Thailand, South Africa and Argentina. Like the 
Arab sub-sample, these four are developing countries that have provided continual, but 
not substantial, flows of migrants to the USA. None of them are oil-producing and they 
have not experienced the severe exchange rate volatility that some of the Arab countries 
have experienced. Each country was selected from a different region of the World, so as 
to allow for variation in migration costs.  
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Description of variables and data  
 
     Our pooled sample consists of annual data beginning with 1992 and ending in 2004 
and includes 182 observations. The dependent variable is the emigration rate.  Because 
U.S. immigration policy distinguishes between different classes of admission, we 
distinguish between the employment emigration rate (U.S. employment visas issued from 
persons whose last permanent country of residence was the source country divided by its 
population) and the total emigration rate (total visas issued from persons whose last 
permanent country of residence was the source country divided by its population).  All 
data on immigrant admissions were obtained from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 
(formerly the Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service), 
published by the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS), now part 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.16 Visa data from 1995 to 2002 were 
obtained from the BCIS’s website,17 while data for earlier years were obtained from the 
Statistical Yearbook.  It should be noted that the employment visa data includ spouses 
and children of individuals who were issued employment visas. Data on source country 
populations were obtained from the online version of the Handbook of Statistics 2005 and 
published on the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 
website.18  
     The independent variables used in our regressions were constructed from the 
following measures: 
(i) Real hourly U.S. wages. These are measured as hourly earnings of production or non-
supervisory workers on private non-farm payrolls, adjusted by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). The nominal hourly earnings data were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
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Statistics website19 and the CPI data were obtained from the online version of the 2004 
Economic Report of the President;20  
(ii) Real wages in the U.K. This is the proxy for real earnings opportunities in the 
alternative destination country. We chose not to use a member of the European Union 
(EU) as the alternative destination country because EU countries switched to the Euro in 
the later part of the sample period. The resulting structural change in their currencies 
could potentially bias estimates of the effects of changes in exchange rates on migration. 
We chose therefore the U.K. as the alternative destination, which historically has been the 
most popular destination in Europe for migrants from the Arab World.21 We used the 
average earnings index for the U.K., adjusted by the U.K. CPI. Data for both the nominal 
earnings index and CPI were obtained from the U.K.’s National Statistics website;22  
(iii) Real per capita GDP in each of the source countries. This proxies the source country 
real income variable (INCOME).There are no continual wage series for any of the source 
countries available for our chosen sample period, so we chose to proxy the real wage 
available in each country by real per capita GDP. We took data on per capita nominal 
GDP for each source country, obtained from the online version of the UNCTAD 
Handbook of Statistics 2005, and adjusted them by each country’s CPI. CPI data were 
obtained from LABORSTA Internet, the online database published by the International 
Labor Organization;23  
(iv) The stock of previous immigrants from the source country. Previous migration flows 
from the source country were measured by the ratio of U.S. residents born in the source 
country to the source country’s population. For the years 1992-99 we used the ratio of 
residents persons born in the source country as of the 1990 decennial census to source 
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country population in each of those years. After 1999, we used the ratio of residents born 
in the source country as of the 2000 census to source country population in each year;24
(v) The exchange rate between the source country’s currency and: (a) the U.S. dollar; 
and (b) the British pound. The exchange rate is measured as the U.S. dollar (British 
pound) price of one unit of the source country’s currency.25 U.S. exchange rate data were 
obtained from International Financial Statistics, published by the International Monetary 
Fund. British exchange rate data were obtained from the website of Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs Department;26
(vi) The real OPEC price of crude oil. We used the average nominal spot price of OPEC 
crude oil for each year, adjusted by the CPI in the source country. Nominal oil price data 
were obtained from the online versions of the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin for 
2005;27  
(vii) The distance in air miles from the source country to the USA, as well as to the U.K. 
This information was obtained from the website, www.indo.com.28
(viii) Dummy variables for geopolitical events relating to the Arab region. We used 
dummies to control for effects that the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the onset of the Iraq-
American War in 2003 may have had on the number of Arab migrants migrating to the 
U.S. The former dummy equals one for the years 2001-04, zero otherwise, and the latter 
dummy equals one for 2003, zero otherwise; 
(ix) A dummy variable for major changes in U.S. immigration policy. We included two 
dummies to control for three acts of Congress during the sample period that may have 
influenced migration from the 14 source countries to the U.S. The first dummy equals 
one for the years beginning in 1996 and controls for the effects of the Illegal Immigration 
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Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Both acts were intended to raise the cost 
of illegally migrating to the U.S., hence we hypothesize a negative sign on β7.29 The 
second dummy equals one for the period 2000-2003, a period during which Congress 
raised the limit on the number of H-1B visas that could be issued to immigrants.30 The 
higher quota for these visas may have encouraged more migration to the U.S., hence we 
hypothesize a positive coefficient on this dummy; 
(x) Source country dummies. There may be differences in migration patterns to the USA 
between the countries not captured by the above explanatory variables. These could 
include differences in income inequality, schooling and other human capital endowments, 
demographics and quality of life. By including source country dummies we control for 
any such differences, particularly since reliable data for the region on many socio-
economic indicators are difficult to obtain or non-existent.  
     Finally, we interacted the real price of oil with a dummy equaling one if the source 
country was an oil-producing one. This was intended to control for internal migration 
between the oil-producing and non-oil-producing Arab states in response to a change in 
the World price of oil.  
     Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the dependent and selected independent 
variables. Total annual admissions from each of the fourteen countries to the U.S. 
averaged 6,207, with employment visas averaging approximately 24% of the total. The 
number of employment visas issued to migrants from the Arab region was very small, 
averaging only 259 each year, whereas total visas issued to Arab migrants averaged 2,513 
(approximately 40% for the sample of countries). This illustrates that the bulk of 
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immigrant admissions to the USA from Arab countries are granted on the basis of criteria 
other than employment, e.g. family ties, refugee or asylum status. Note also that real per 
capita GDP in the source countries averaged only U.S.$4,574, but varied considerably 
across countries and over time, since the coefficient of variation is approximately 130%. 
The stock of previous immigrants from the source country residing in the U.S. averaged 
slightly over 0.5% of source country population during the sample period. U.S.-Arab and 
U.K.-Arab exchange rates were quite volatile during the period, as was the real price of 
oil. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Estimated regression results     
     Table 2 shows coefficient estimates for Ordinary Least Squares regressions of total 
and employment emigration rates. Equations I and II include the exchange rate ratio as 
the proxy for relative migration affordability, whereas the other two equations include the 
relative affordability ratio described earlier. All coefficient estimates are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. In our 
discussion below, since many of the coefficient estimates are extremely small numbers 
due to the extremely small emigration rates from many of the source countries, we 
provide interpretations using mean values of source population and the various 
independent variables as base values. 
(Table 2 about here) 
     Our most important result, which is robust across all four specifications, is that the 
demand for U.S. visas is positively related to the real relative return to remittances. The 
relationship is not as strong for employment visa demand, however. According to 
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equation I, if the exchange rate-adjusted real wage ratio rises by one point from its mean 
of 14.59 to 15.59 (an increase of 6.85%), total admissions to the U.S. rise by 18 persons. 
While this effect is small, it is significant at better than 1%. According to equation II, a 
one-unit increase in the real relative return to remittances will, all other things equal, 
increase employment admissions by approximately 3 persons. Similar size predictions are 
implied by equations III and IV.  All four equations strongly confirm our hypothesis that 
a ceteris paribus change in the expected return to remitting a migrant’s income back 
home does indeed influence the amount of U.S. migration. 
     Equations I through IV suggest that relative relocation costs appear not to matter in 
the migration decision.31 However, increases in real income in the source country 
(measured by per capital real GDP) are predicted to reduce the volume of employment 
admissions, but not the volume of total admissions. According to equation II, for 
example, a $1,000 increase in the source country’s real per capita real GDP from its mean 
value of $4,574 will induce ceteris paribus a drop in employment admissions of 
approximately 700 persons. The significance of this variable for only the employment 
admissions equations does not surprise us, for we would expect that economic conditions 
in the source country would be considerably more important for persons migrating 
strictly in response to differences in labor market opportunities. Persons migrating 
primarily for non-economic reasons, who comprise more than 75% of all Arab migrants 
to the USA, are likely to be much less sensitive to differences in labor market 
opportunities.  
     All four equations strongly confirm the model’s prediction that changes in the World 
price of oil will affect U.S. admissions. According to equation I, for example, a one dollar 
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increase in the real price of oil from its mean value of $20.53 is predicted to cause total 
U.S. admissions to rise by approximately 505 persons annually, whereas equation II 
predicts that employment admissions will rise by 103 persons. These findings indicate 
that the main reason for why oil prices affect emigration is because higher prices  on 
balance make long distance international migration more affordable. 
      Past migration flows are found to influence total admissions to the U.S., but not 
employment-related admissions. Equations I and III predict that for every person who has 
migrated from the source country in the past, approximately 4-5 persons will follow him 
later. Ties to family and friends in the host country would be expected to matter most to 
migrants motivated by reasons other than differences in economic opportunities between 
source and host countries. This is exactly what our results appear to confirm.       
       Geopolitical events and source country policy changes all appear to affect total and 
employment admissions. Emigration rates were ceteris paribus higher following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, but lower following the onset of the 2003 Iraq-American War. 
According to equation I, for example, the coefficient on the 9/11 dummy predicts that 
ceteris paribus total admissions rose by 3,461 persons following the terrorist attacks, but 
fell by 8,794 persons following the onset of the War. According to equation II, 
employment admissions rose ceteris paribus by 2,058 persons following the terrorist 
attacks, but fell by 1,965 persons following the onset of the War. 
     U.S. legislation which raised the costs of illegally migrating to the U.S. appears to 
have had the intended effects on both total and employment admissions to the U.S.  
Across all four equations, the two Congressional acts signed into law in 1996 contributed 
to lowering total and employment emigration rates by significant amounts. However, 
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increases in the quota of H-1B visas appear to have lowered emigration rates, contrary to 
our model’s prediction. Finally, our results indicate some evidence that higher oil prices 
may have triggered internal migration to oil-producing states. The estimated coefficients 
on the oil price x country dummy interactions are negative and significant for some of the 
oil-producing countries, more so for employment admissions.  
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
     We conclude that in addition to the traditional factors affecting international 
migration, emigration from the Arab World to the U.S. is significantly influenced by 
three factors – geopolitical instability associated with the region, exchange rates and the 
price of oil. Specifically, we obtained two striking results in this study. First, migration 
flows from the Arab region to the U.S. depend upon the relative real value of remittances 
sent home. This strongly supports the view of the New Economics of Migration that 
migration from the Developing to the Developed World is fundamentally a family 
decision and that remittances are used by families as an instrument of self-insurance. This 
finding also implies a strong linkage between exchange rates, migration flows and the 
contribution of remittances to foreign direct investment in the Arab region. Second, we 
find that higher oil prices appear to stimulate, not discourage, U.S. migration. This 
suggests that a strengthened oil market does not on balance appear to lead to a 
substitution of internal for external Arab migration. Instead, higher oil prices may have 
had the effect of making U.S. migration more affordable. Finally, emigration rates were 
found to be higher after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, controlling for other factors, suggesting 
that the attacks did not impose spillover costs on prospective Arab migrants.       
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     We find that total emigration rates were lower during the first year of the Iraq-
American War, all other factors held constant. Furthermore, emigration to the U.S. has 
been significantly influenced by family ties and enclave effects, real earnings 
opportunities in the U.S and Europe and real per capita output in the Arab region. Recent 
U.S. policies aimed at controlling illegal immigration appear to have lowered emigration 
rates from the Arab region.  
      Our findings have important implications for further study of emigration from 
developing to developed countries. For example, African emigration to the U.S. and 
Europe is likely also to have been influenced by commodity prices, exchange rates and 
regional political events. The same story is likely to be the case for emigration to the 
U.S., Canada and Europe from the former Soviet Union, South America and developing 
Asia. It will be interesting to see whether the results we obtained, particularly for 
exchange rates, oil prices and political events, are replicated for these other regions of the 
World. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Total visas 
issued by U.S. 
authorities  
6,207 12,055 534 66,864 
Employment 
emigration rate 
1,510 5,154 10 39,793 
Real relative 
return to 
remittances 
14.586 63.179 0.0096 362.57 
Real hourly 
U.S. wage 
$7.95 $0.27 $7.63 $8.34 
Average real 
earnings index 
in U.K. 
90.20 8.42 80.31 104.96 
Stock of 
previous 
immigrants 
from source 
country 
residing in U.S. 
105,260 231,780 1,656 1,369,100 
Real per capita 
GDP in source 
country (in U.S. 
dollars) 
$4,573.60 $5,917.20 $9.39 $23,768.00 
U.S. Exchange 
rate  
$0.49 $0.88 $0.000507 $3.41 
U.K. Exchange 
Rate  
0.00453 Pounds 0.00151 Pounds 0.00033 Pounds 2.2635 Pounds 
Real price of 
OPEC oil (in 
U.S. dollars) 
$20.53 $10.61 $0.39 $93.13 
Sample size 182    
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Table 2 
Coefficient Estimates of emigration rate equations 
 (t-ratios in parentheses; boldface indicates significant at 10% or better) 
VARIABLE I 
Total 
emigration 
rate 
II 
Employment 
emigration rate 
III 
Total 
emigration 
rate 
IV 
Employment 
emigration rate 
Exchange rate-
adjusted real 
wage ratio 
0.00000019
(2.83) 
0.000000037
(1.89) 
0.00000020
(2.50) 
0.000000029 
(1.30) 
Exchange 
rate ratio 
0.000049 
(0.77) 
0.000066 
(3.91) 
  
Relative 
affordability 
of migration 
  0.000012 
(0.34) 
-0.000002 
(-0.66) 
Real GDP 
per capita  
-0.000000007 
(-0.98) 
-0.0000000075 
(-4.04) 
-0.000000005 
(-0.69) 
-0.0000000045 
(-2.20) 
Real price of 
oil 
0.0000054 
(2.027) 
0.0000011 
(2.91) 
0.0000052 
(1.98) 
0.00000086 
(2.33) 
Past 
immigration  
0.0409 
(2.02) 
0.0048 
(0.71) 
0.0427 
(2.22) 
0.0072 
(1.11) 
Post 9/11 
Period 
Control 
0.000037 
(1.75) 
0.000022 
(3.40) 
0.000038 
(1.77) 
0.000023 
(3.37) 
Iraq war 
control 
-0.000094 
(-3.47) 
-0.000021 
(-2.89) 
-0.000098 
(-3.56) 
-0.000025 
(-3.80) 
IIRIA and 
PRWOR 
Acts  
-0.000062 
(-2.94) 
-0.000013 
(-2.82) 
-0.000064 
(-2.92) 
-0.000014 
(-3.47) 
HB1 Quota 
Control 
-0.000075 
(-3.2) 
-0.000022 
(-3.44) 
-0.000074 
(-3.18) 
-0.000021 
(-3.25) 
Iraqi dummy 0.00002 
(0.26) 
-0.000041 
(-1.74) 
0.000032 
(0.37) 
-0.000041 
(-2.47) 
Jordanian 
dummy 
0.00055 
(4.01) 
-0.00010 
(-3.33) 
0.00061 
(4.26) 
-0.000031 
(-0.67) 
Lebanese 
dummy 
0.000017 
(0.03) 
-0.000018 
(-0.20) 
-0.000025 
(-0.05) 
-0.000081 
(-0.46) 
Egyptian 
dummy 
0.00008 
(0.94) 
-0.000024 
(-0.65) 
0.000094 
(0.98) 
-0.000021 
(-1.52) 
Kuwaiti 
dummy 
0.00012 
(0.26) 
-0.00037 
(-3.09) 
0.00046 
(3.34) 
0.000071 
(1.65) 
Moroccan 
dummy 
0.00003 
(0.88) 
-0.000041 
(-3.97) 
0.000037 
(1.07) 
-0.000035 
(-5.63) 
Saudi 
dummy 
0.00011 
(1.66) 
-0.000004 
(-0.17) 
0.00011 
(1.59) 
-0.000013 
(-0.88) 
Syrian 
dummy 
0.00008 
(0.97) 
-0.00001 
(-0.43) 
0.000076 
(0.93) 
-0.000014 
(-0.77) 
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UAE 
dummy 
0.00039 
(3.05) 
0.00003 
(0.74) 
0.00036 
(2.80) 
-0.000012 
(-0.28) 
Yemeni 
dummy 
0.00018 
(2.60) 
-0.000019 
(-0.95) 
0.00018 
(2.54) 
-0.000014 
(-1.32) 
Indian 
dummy 
-0.00003 
(-1.01) 
-0.000036 
(-3.25) 
-0.000023 
(-0.74) 
-0.000028 
(-3.39) 
Thai dummy 0.0001 
(1.34) 
-0.000036 
(-3.59) 
0.00009 
(1.23) 
-0.000035 
(-3.45) 
Argentinian 
dummy 
-0.00004 
(-0.81) 
-0.000019 
(-1.41) 
-0.000025 
(-0.56) 
-0.0000008 
(-0.06) 
Iraq x Real 
oil price 
-0.000004 
(-1.42) 
-0.000001 
(-1.22) 
-0.0000037 
(-1.39) 
-0.00000081 
(-2.16) 
Egypt x Real 
oil price 
-0.000004 
(-1.03) 
-0.000008 
(-0.50) 
-0.000004 
(-1.00) 
-0.0000006 
(-1.06) 
Kuwait x 
Real oil price 
-0.00001 
(-1.45) 
0.0000025 
(1.65) 
-0.000011 
(-1.81) 
0.0000007 
(0.31) 
Saudi x Real 
oil price 
-0.0000008 
(-0.23) 
0.0000013 
(1.12) 
-0.0000009 
(-0.25) 
0.0000012 
(1.42) 
Syria x Real 
oil price 
-0.000003 
(-0.95) 
-0.0000009 
(-0.70) 
-0.0000032 
(-0.95) 
-0.0000008 
(-1.52) 
UAE x Real 
oil price 
-0.0000002 
(-0.09) 
0.0000063 
(4.35) 
-0.0000003 
(-0.12) 
0.0000061 
(4.24) 
Yemen x 
Real oil price 
-0.000006 
(-2.08) 
-0.0000012 
(-1.75) 
-0.0000058 
(-2.00) 
-0.000001 
(-2.65) 
Constant 0.000005 
(2.03) 
0.0000038 
(2.29) 
-0.000031 
(-0.40) 
0.000034 
(3.34) 
Adjusted R2 0.9057 0.7846 0.9056 0.7638 
Sum of 
squared 
errors 
0.0000018 0.00000008 0.0000018 0.00000009 
Sample size 182 182 182 182 
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VI. FOOTNOTES 
1 See, for example, recent work by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001, 2003) and 
Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003). 
2 See recent work by McCormick and Wahba (2000) and Rapoport and Docquier (2003), 
for example. 
3 See Chiswick (1988), Hill and Pearce (1990) and Cobb-Clark, Shiells and Lowell 
(1995), for example. 
4 See Stark and Levhari (1982), Stark (1984) and Katz and Stark (1986). 
5 Network effects are the ties that a prospective migrant has to family, friends and 
business associates in the receiving country. These effects are generally stronger the 
greater is the number of previous migrants residing in the receiving country and, more 
specifically, the size of an immigrant enclave in a particular region or city. 
6 For two studies that provide a thorough treatment of the effects of receiving country 
immigration policies, see  Greenwood and McDowell (1991) and Hatton and Williamson 
(2002). 
7 See the The Economics of Migration, Vols. I-IV, edited by Klaus F. Zimmerman and 
Thomas K. Bauer, Edward Elgar, 2002, for a very comprehensive collection of papers on 
all aspects of the subject. Another worthwhile, more multidisciplinary, survey is Douglas 
S. Massey, et al, “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” 
Population and Development Review 19 (September, 1993), pp. 431-66. 
8 An exception is Greenwood & McDowell’s (1991) study on the volume of migration 
flows to the USA and Canada. They created two variables capturing political conditions 
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in the source country: an index of political rights and a dummy indicating the country’s 
involvement in an international crisis related to war or serious clashes with another 
nation. Greenwood & McDowell found both variables to be statistically significant 
explanators of migration flows. 
9 We should mention two studies that have been useful to us in framing this study. These 
are Birks, Seccombe and Sinclair’s (1986) study on internal migration of oil workers to 
the Arab Gulf and  Adams’s (1993) study on the economic and demographic 
determinants of internal migration from Rural Egypt. Nigem’s (1986) study on the 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of Arab Americans is also useful in 
understanding the composition of Arab migrant flows to the USA.  Ours is the first study 
that examines empirically the determinants of international migration from the Arab 
region and relates this to recent economic and political events. We should point out that 
there have been a number of studies done on international emigration from Africa, e.g. 
Stark (1991), Hatton and Williamson (2001) and Myburgh (2004), but nothing from the 
Arab region. 
10 According to the 2002 Arab Human Development Report, with a current annual 
population growth rate of 2.7% (or 10 million people annually, compared with a global 
growth rate averaging 1.7%), demographic projections suggest that the region’s 
population will reach 459 million in 2020.   These figures present a major challenge to 
the Arab economy, which must grow at least 6% annually in order to absorb increases in 
population.  Even now, Arab economies cannot keep up with the sizes of their 
workforces. According to the World Bank’s 1998 World Employment Report, during the 
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mid 1990s only 37% of employable workers participated in Egypt’s labor force and only 
29% did so in Jordan’s labor force. There is also great diversity between Arab countries 
with respect to their population sizes.  For example, according to the 2002 Arab Human 
Development Report, Egypt has a population of 67 million, Sudan has 31 million and 
Algeria and Morocco both have about 30 million. In contrast, Bahrain’s population is 
only 640,000 and the populations of Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are 
560,000, 1.91 million, and 2.61 million people respectively. 
11 The oil-producing states include Algeria, Egypt, Syria,Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab emirates and the non oil-producing 
states include Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Sudan, Comoros, Somalia, Palestine 
and Djibouti.      
12 During the oil boom period of the 1960s and 1970s, the economic growth rate of the 
Arab region was among the highest in the World; unemployment rates were close to zero 
and oil-driven prosperity led to a significant improvement in many indicators of 
economic development. The combination of rapid economic development and a limited 
supply of indigenous labor in the oil producing countries between 1970 and 1985 resulted 
in considerable dependence on migrant labor, mainly from non oil-producing countries.  
In the mid 1990s, migrant labor constituted about 35% of an Arab country’s labor force 
on average, and as much as 80% of the labor force in some oil producing countries such 
as the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait (World Bank, 1995).  The collapse of oil prices 
in 1986 marked the end of the oil boom era. The decline in the demand for labor in the 
non oil-producing countries, coupled with a decline in the demand for migrant labor in 
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the oil-producing countries, encouraged international emigration from the Arab region, 
primarily to Europe and the U.S.  However, the spot price of OPEC crude oil rose by over 
40% between 1992 and 2003, which may have had negative effects on Arab emigration 
to other parts of the World.  
13 The countries currently receiving large remittances from migrant workers, both 
overseas and within the region, include Egypt ($2.9 billion), Lebanon ($2.3 billion) and 
Jordan ($2 billion). In 2002 the entire Arab region received $14 billion in remittances, 
totaling 2.2% of regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP), making the region the highest 
receiver of remittances in the world (World Bank 2003) 
14 For example, the U.S. price of an Iraqi Dinar fell from an average 4.76 U.S. cents in 
1992 to an average of approximately 5/100 of a U.S. cent in 2003. 
15 For example, if the U.S. price of an Arab country’s currency rises, then Arabs 
contemplating migration to the U.S. are likely to face lower relocation costs (lower 
airfares and lower start-up costs following arrival in the U.S., for example). Suppose the 
U.K. is an attractive alternative destination for Arab migrants. We hypothesize that 
migration to the U.S. will be encouraged only if the Arab price of the dollar falls relative 
to the Arab price of the British pound. In contrast, if the U.S. price of an Arab currency 
falls relative to its U.K. counterpart, the costs of migrating to the U.S. relative to the costs 
of migrating to the U.K. will rise and this will lower emigration to the U.S. 
16 BCIS is the successor to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which was part of 
the U.S. Department of Justice.   
17 See http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/index.htm 
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18 See http://www.unctad.org. 
19 See ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.ceseeb2.txt. 
20 See http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop. 
21 According to the Migration Information Source (http://www.migrationinformation.org), the 
top two European destinations for Arab migrants are Germany and the U.K. Based on the 
most recently available data from that source, 226,149 persons born in the Middle East 
were residing in the U.K. in 2001 (105,981 of those persons were from countries other 
than Cyprus and Iran). In 2002, 173,334 persons from the Arab region (including 83,299 
from Iraq, 47,827 from Lebanon and 28,679 from Syria) were residing in Germany. 
22 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase. 
23 See http://laborsta.ilo.org. CPI data for Iraq were obtained from the Central Bank of 
Iraq’s Statistical Bulletin and the Annual Bulletin for 2003, 2004 and 2005. These 
materials are available from the bank’s website, located at 
http://www.cbiraq.org/cbs7.htm.  
24 Foreign-born population stock data for census years 1990 are taken from Gibson and 
Lennon (1999), which is available online at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029.html. The 
same information for 2000 came from the census website. 
25 The Pound is the official currency in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, the Riyal is the official 
currency in Saudi Arabia, the Dinar is the official currency in Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait, 
the Dirham is the official currency in Morocco and UAE, the Rial is the official currency 
in Yemen, the Rupee is India’s currency, the Baht is Thailand’s currency, the Peso is 
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Argentina’s currency and the Rand is the South African currency. A number of the 
countries had fixed exchange rates during some or all of the sample period (Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria and UAE) and several of the countries experienced devaluations during the 
sample period (Argentina and South Africa).   
26 See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/exrate. 
27 See http://www.opec.org/library 
28 See http://www.indo.com/distance/. This is a Web service that uses data from the U.S. 
census and a supplementary list of cities around the World to find the latitude and 
longitude of two places, and then calculates the distances between them. 
29 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act set up a telephone clearing 
house where employers could verify the immigrant status of prospective employees, as 
well as increasing funds for the Border Patrol. The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act barred non-citizens from some types of public assistance, 
and eligibility for some other types of assistance was made more difficult. 
30 These are visas issued to aliens who will be employed in high-skill occupations usually 
requiring high levels of training and education, e.g. professional workers in the high-tech 
industries. The numerical limitation on H1-B visas was raised from 65,000 to 195,000 in 
fiscal years 2001-03, thus our dummy equaled one for the 4 years beginning with 2000. 
31 Note that the exchange rate ratio is a significant determinant of the employment 
emigration rate; when the exchange rate ratio rises one point from its mean (from 0.63 to 
1.63), the demand for employment visas rises by 6,175, a result significant at better than 
1%.        
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